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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a secure, ﬂexible, robust and fully distributed signature service, for ad hoc groups.
In order to provide the service, we use a new threshold scheme, that allows to share a secret key among
the current group members. The novelty of the scheme is in that it easily and eﬃciently enables dynamic
increase of the threshold, according to the needs of the group, so that the service provides both adaptiveness
to the level of threat the ad hoc group is subject to, and availability. We prove the correctness of the protocol
and evaluate its eﬃciency. The changes to the threshold are performed by using a protocol that is eﬃcient
in terms of interactions among nodes and per-node required resources, resulting suitable even for resource-
constrained settings. Finally, the same proposed scheme allows to detect nodes that attempt to disrupt the
service, providing invalid contributions to the distributed signature service.
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1 Introduction and Background
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are inherently self-organized, large-scale and
fault-tolerant networks, made of miniature wireless devices such as PDAs, cellular
phones, Pocket PCs. They generally exhibit dynamic membership and topology,
i.e. nodes can join and leave the network, as well as fail, over time. In particular,
their size may change drastically in a short time period. MANETs, as in common
ad hoc groups, can be characterized by a not-hierarchical structure, such that their
nodes are autonomous peers. Due to their ability to provide a wide range of services,
their use can be appealing for both military and civilian applications. Further, they
are expected to be employed for providing pervasive services, playing a crucial role
in any aspect of everyday life, impacting the way people work, and interact with
each other, and the way business, education, entertainment, and health-care are
operating, depicting the vision of anytime ubiquitous computing.
However, MANETs introduce new security challenges, compared to traditional
wired or cellular wireless networks, due to: dynamic topology, produced by mobility
and change in the number and distribution of active nodes in the network; severe
resource constraints, that call for power-eﬃcient protocols; absence of a trusted
infrastructure; necessity for group oriented distributed services and protocols. These
challenges have stimulated considerable research interest in recent years, because
ad hoc networks cannot be adopted widespread, without adequate security. In
particular, features such as decentralized operation and dynamic membership, bring
a bulk of challenges from the perspective of security, such as member authentication,
access control, secure group communication, and secure routing, to cite a few.
In this paper, we present a distributed signature scheme for ad hoc networks,
that improves over current solutions. Basically, a signature Sig(m) of a message m
is an encryption of m using a secret key sk, that is Sig(m) = [m]sk. In practice,
any signature scheme is generally applied to hashed values of messages, rather than
to the messages themselves; the hashed values are computed by using a strong hash
function, such as SHA-1. Here, for ease of presentation, we assume that m is an
already such hashed value. The signature needs to be veriﬁable by using a public
key pk, that is, for any valid signature Sig(m), it is required that [Sig(m)]pk = m
holds.
In order to distribute a signature service, two tools are necessary: one for gener-
ating the <sk, pk> pair, and one for distributing, among a set of distinct individuals,
the ability to sign messages under sk. In the following, we assume the MANET to
have associated an RSA key pair <sk, pk>. Current solutions, for distributing the
signing ability to a group of individuals, are based on standard threshold schemes [4],
in which sk is divided into a given number of shares that are distributed to as many
cosigners.
The main limitation of standard threshold schemes is that they tolerate only a ﬁx
number of corruptions, regardless the dimension of the network. Indeed, in ad hoc
settings, the members of the network typically exhibit physical vulnerabilities and
they are exposed to attacks by adversaries able to compromise and/or corrupt likely
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many of them. This is likely to occur for large-scale long-lived networks, because
the probability to compromise a suﬃciently large number (up to the threshold) of
shares increases with the number of nodes. In order to limit the corruption power of
a mobile adversary, generally proactive secret sharing [1] is employed. However, such
a defence is not eﬀective against silent adversaries that behave honestly, as long as
they control a number of nodes below the threshold. We claim that, in order to cope
with such a kind of adversary, it is necessary to increase the robustness of the secret
sharing scheme employed, i.e. to increase the threshold. Unfortunately, typical
secret sharing schemes found in the literature are aﬀected by a major limitation,
that is their robustness does not scale with the number of members in the network; in
fact, increasing the robustness of these schemes generally requires several messages
exchange among all the nodes of the network, that can be too expensive for MANET
environments.
We propose a novel secret sharing scheme that additively shares sk among all the
current members of the network, so that limited subgroups of them, provided with
diﬀerent shares, can act on behalf of the group, and collectively issue a signature.
The scheme is basically a (t,t)-threshold scheme in which shares are replicated, and
the value of the threshold t can be enlarged, in order to increase the robustness
of the signature scheme. Each member belonging to the subgroup, separately and
independently issues a partial signature, and all the partial signatures are combined
afterwards by the applicant, in order to have a standard signature. Further, the
dimension of the produced signature does not depend on the size of the subgroup,
and it is possible to easily verify the signature correctness. Finally, it is possible to
detect cosigners attempting to cheat.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we propose the novel additive scheme for sharing an RSA
secret key, and the share replication policy enforced. In Section 4, we present the
protocols executed to issue a distributed signature and to increase the robustness
of the scheme. In Section 5 we provide the proof of correctness of the signature
scheme. In Section 6 we evaluate the eﬃciency of the scheme in terms of both space
and computational requirements. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize the results.
2 Related Work
The general notion of threshold signature has been introduced in [4]. In [5] a non-
robust and non-interactive RSA scheme is presented, with no security analysis. The
scheme is extended in [8], with a new synchronized scheme, and further in [3] with
a non-robust and non-synchronized scheme, in which the share size grows linearly
with the number of cosigners. The linear growth of the share size limits its scal-
ability. In [10, 9, 16] robust threshold RSA schemes that require synchronization
are considered, and rigorously analyzed. These schemes are proactive threshold
schemes [1], i.e. they periodically refresh the shares, without changing the signing
key. The current best RSA-based scheme seems to be [16], however, if N is the RSA
modulus and n is the number of cosigners, the size of the key used for the signature
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generation is 2 log(nN) and the memory requirement is 2n log(nN). Some schemes
such as [2, 11] are veriﬁable, i.e. they permit to check whether the partial signa-
tures and the newly created shares have been correctly computed. In [22] a robust,
veriﬁable, and non-interactive scheme based on RSA is presented; the size of any
individual signature is bounded by a constant times the size of the RSA modulus;
however it assumes a static corruption model: the adversary must choose which
cosigners to attack at the very beginning of the attack. All the previous schemes
assume a limited number of cosigners: this number is considered ﬁxed, and the
system needs to restart if it changes. In [14] a scalable threshold RSA signature
scheme is proposed: new shares can be computed from existing shares but, in or-
der to keep secret the initial shares, an expensive synchronized interaction among
existing cosigners is required. Moreover, as it has been shown in [15], the scheme is
not robust. A recent work [18] permits to avoid any interaction among the existing
cosigners. Other works [19, 20, 13] propose solutions based on threshold signatures
for ad hoc and peer-to-peer environments, however they do not address the prob-
lem of increasing the threshold. In [7] a distributed signature scheme, speciﬁcally
suitable for MANETs in which connectivity is partial, is presented. The scheme is
robust against Byzantine adversaries, and does not need any trusted dealer; more-
over, it is eﬃcient, requiring little interaction for the signature issuance/veriﬁcation
phases.
Among the above schemes, only the two protocols in [9] permit to change the
threshold, but this is achieved with multiple communication rounds, and needs the
simultaneous on-line presence of all the cosigners. Another scheme that provides
dynamic threshold is presented in [6]; the scheme does not require the intermediate
reconstruction of the secret, and permits to transform a given threshold scheme
into another, even between disjoint sets of cosigners; however, the scheme is not
robust and compromised cosigners can distribute incorrect shares to newly admitted
members. The same shortcoming can be referred to [9].
3 Distributed Signature Service
In this section, we assume the reader familiar with the RSA [17] signature scheme.
The proposed additive secret sharing scheme is based on the following observation:
∀m ∈ N+, v  α mod m ≡ v mod m, provided that α is the neutral element with
respect to the operation . Further, if r0  r1  . . .  rt−1 ≡ α mod m, and  is
commutative and associative, it follows that:
(v  r0) . . . (v  rt−1) ≡ v  . . . v︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
mod m.
In Zm, by choosing  = +, than 0 is the neutral element. Hence, if we restrict
t to be a positive odd number, and bind the sign of v to the index i, we have:∑t−1
i=0((−1)
iv + ri) ≡ v mod m. In order to ensure that
∑t−1
i=0 ri ≡ 0 mod m, it is
enough to choose ri, i = 0, . . . , t− 2 as random values in Zm and rt−1 ≡ −
∑t−2
i=0 ri
mod m, so that
∑t−1
i=0 ri ≡ 0 mod m, by construction.
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Hence, a secret RSA exponent d can be shared among t cosigners (t odd), by
using shares of kind:
si ≡ (−1)
id + ri mod φ(N), i = 0, . . . , t− 1
where ri is an integer such that, if t is the required threshold to issue a signature,
then:
∑t−1
i=0 ri ≡ 0 mod φ(N). Moreover, in order to provide veriﬁability, each
share si can be bound to a corresponding public veriﬁer :
wi ≡ (−1)
i + e · ri mod φ(N), i = 0, . . . , t− 1
where e is the public RSA exponent, corresponding to d. Upon receipt of a share si,
any cosigner can verify si’s correctness, by ensuring that (a
si)e ≡ awi mod N , for
an arbitrary a. Indeed (asi)e ≡ (a(−1)
id+ri mod φ(N))e ≡ a(−1)
i+e·ri mod φ(N) ≡ awi
mod N . Note that, as long as φ(N) is unknown, wi does not provide any information
about the corresponding share, or about the secret signing key.
Similar arguments hold by working in Z instead of Zm, that is performing the
operations showed above without computing the modulus. In particular, by con-
sidering Z, it is possible to increase the robustness of the scheme of an arbitrary
value k, by means of the following share-split procedure: a) by using a round robin
policy, select a share si to split; b) choose k as a positive odd number; c) ran-
domly select a share sj, j = i; then, generate k + 1 new shares: s
′
i = si + u0,
st+g−1 = (−1)
gsi + ug, g = 1, . . . , k, and an update factor s
′′
i = si + uk+1, such that∑k+1
j=0 uj = 0. Finally, replace si with s
′
i and update sj with s
′
j = sj + s
′′
i . At the
end of the share-split procedure, k brand new shares st+g−1, g = 1, . . . , k have been
created, and two shares s′i, s
′
j have been proactively updated. The corresponding
veriﬁers are set to: w′i = wi + e · u0, wt+g−1 = (−1)
g + e · ug, g = 1, . . . , k, and
w′j = wj + wi + e · uk+1. Note that we used equalities (=) instead of congruences
(≡) since we were operating in Z instead of Zm. It can be proved that, unless the
adversary controls si, the robustness of the scheme increases of an arbitrary odd
factor k ≥ 1, upon the completion of the share-split procedure. Note that this is
performed by updating only two existing shares, namely si and sj, without facing
interpolation over Zφ(N) as in [14]. Moreover, the scheme can be extended to pro-
vide a proactive renewal of all the shares: it is enough to update each share si by a
single update factor ui, where the update factors are chosen such that
∑t−1
i=0 ui = 0,
and t is the current number of diﬀerent shares.
The drawback of the proposed solution could be the growth of both the share and
veriﬁer size, because their values are computed over Z, instead of Zφ(N). However,
as we show in Section 6, this growth in size, that could have a severe impact on both
communications and computations overhead, is very limited, making the solution
feasible and eﬃcient.
Unlike typical (t,n)-threshold schemes, in which each node is provided with a
diﬀerent share, here there are only t diﬀerent shares, that are replicated: diﬀerent
cosigners are provided with the same share, according to the following distribution
constraint: let x be the unique identifer of node Dx, si is distributed to Dx if and
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only if:
F (x) ≡ i (mod t) (1)
where F is a hashing function mapping the set of cosigner identiﬁers into {0, . . . , t− 1}.
As long as F is chosen uniformly at random from a universal hash family, the prob-
ability that two cosigners have the same share is less than or equal to 1/t. This
property is essential if we want the ad hoc network to provide an ubiquitous service:
diﬀerent shares will be evenly distributed among the nodes, then the service could be
provided at each node’s locality. Basically, enforcing the distribution constraint (1)
partitions the set of cosigners into t classes, Ct0, . . . , C
t
t−1, corresponding to shares
si, i = 0, . . . , t− 1. With notation C
t
i , we denote the class of nodes corresponding
to the ith share, when t is the necessary number of shares for reconstructing the
signing key, and with Dji we denote a member of C
t
i ; in other words, each Dji ∈ C
t
i
is provided with si. Note that, in such a scheme, the minimum eﬀort required to
the adversary for denying the service is to compromise all the replicas of a given
share, that is the eﬀort to corrupt all the nodes into a given class. Moreover, since
the shares are distributed by enforcing (1), it can be shown that, as the number of
cosigners increases, all the classes have asymptotically the same size.
4 Protocols
In this section we present the protocols executed by the nodes of the network in order
to issue a signature, and to increase the threshold. We make standard assumptions:
each member Dx of the group has a unique nonzero identiﬁer x, such as a MAC
address; Dx is connected via a broadcast communication channel to the neighbors
in its transmission range; Dx can fail, dynamically join or leave the network, and
has a source of randomness. Moreover, we assume that there is a routing layer for
reliable message delivery. Messages are exchanged through secure channels.
4.1 Setup
We assume that the network is initialized by a trusted dealer D, that chooses a
group secret key sk = (d,N), and shares sk in such a way that any set of t nodes,
one for each class, is able to issue a signature. For each share si, D also computes a
corresponding veriﬁer wi that can be used for misbehavior detection. Note that D
needs only to initialize t initial nodes, while other nodes can be initialized with the
cooperation of that initial set. After the setup phase, the dealer is not necessary
any longer. D performs the following actions:
R. Di Pietro et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 93–10598
(i) create an RSA key-pair <sk = (d,N), pk = (e,N)>;
(ii) choose the original threshold t; t is a positive odd number;
(iii) generate t random numbers ri ∈
[
−N−12 ,
N−1
2
]
such that:∑t−1
i=0 ri ≡ 0 mod φ(N);
(iv) compute si ≡ (−1)
id + ri mod φ(N);
(v) compute wi ≡ (−1)
i + e · ri mod φ(N);
(vi) distribute shares to at least t members, enforcing (1);
(vii) publish <pk, t, w0, . . . , wt−1>;
(viii) destroy any computed value.
4.2 Signature Issuance and Veriﬁcation
Once shares si, i = 0, . . . , t− 1, have been distributed to n ≥ t initial cosigners, the
signature service can start. Any applicant Dx can obtain a signature Sig(m) for
a message m with the consent of at least t cosigners belonging to diﬀerent classes.
The protocol consists of two rounds of communication:
(i) Dx sends a signature request to the group, specifying the message
m;
(ii) upon receipt of the request, at least t cosigners Dji , i = 0, . . . , t −
1, one for each class, compute t partial signatures pSigji(m) =
[m]si ≡ (m)
si mod N , where si ≡ (−1)
id + ri mod φ(N) is the
cosigner’s share. Then, each cosigner replies with the computed
partial signature.
Note that each cosigner can perform its job asynchronously, i.e. it neither re-
quires to coordinate with other nodes, nor to be aware of other node’s identities or
on-line presence.
Upon receipt of t partial signatures, Dx reconstructs Sig(m) ≡
∏t−1
i=0 pSigji(m)
mod N , and checks for its correctness, by ensuring that Sig(m)e ≡ m mod N ; if
the veriﬁcation fails, Dx checks for correctness of each partial signature, ensuring
that pSigji(m)
e ≡ mwi mod N . The action to be taken once a partial signature is
recognized as fake is out of the scope of this paper.
4.3 Threshold increase
In order to increase the threshold, new shares are generated from existing ones, by
using the share-split procedure, described in section 3, and a fraction of cosigners
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are redistributed into the newly created classes. The protocol that we describe here
permits to increase the scheme’s robustness from value t to value t + k, with k a
positive odd number, any time it is executed.
In accordance with a stated policy, a member Dji is designated to execute the
split procedure on its share si. Dji distributes the new shares by means of the
following protocol:
(i) Dji sends an increase threshold request to each member Dli in its
current class, specifying the new share-veriﬁer pair
< s′li , w
′
li
>;
(ii) Dji sends an update request to each member Dlj of a randomly
selected class, specifying the update factor s′′i = si + uk+1;
(iii) ﬁnally, Dji broadcasts a list comprising of all the computed veriﬁers
and w′k+1 = e · uk+1.
Upon receipt of the list and the new share-veriﬁer pair, each Dli checks for the
correctness of the received values, by ensuring that w′i +w
′
j +
∑k−1
g=0 wt+g = wi +wj ,
and (a
s′
li )e ≡ a
w′
li mod N , for an arbitrary a. If the check succeeds, Dli drops
its current share, accepting s′li , otherwise it raises a policy dependant exception;
each Dlj performs the same checks as Dli , and if they succeed, each Dlj updates its
current share s′j = sj + s
′′
i , otherwise it raises an exception.
Note that only those cosigners in Cti and in C
t
x take part in the protocol, that is,
in order to increase the threshold, only a fraction of the cosigners need to cooperate.
This permits to save network resources, by limiting the communication traﬃc and
the overall computations performed by the nodes of the network.
At the end of the protocol, k new classes have been created, and they are ﬁlled
with those cosigners who acquired the new shares, i.e. the members in Cti are
reallocated into Ct+ki , C
t+k
t , . . . , C
t+k
t+k−1, where C
t+k
i replaces C
t
i . In order to evenly
reallocate those cosigners, Dji enforces the following share distribution: a member
with unique identiﬁer l is assigned to class Ct+kt+j , 0 ≤ j ≤ k−1, if and only if F (l) ≡ j
mod k + 1, where F is a hashing function mapping the set of node identiﬁers into
{0, . . . , k}, otherwise it is assigned to Ct+ki . Note that, as long as the selection of
the share to split is performed with a round robin policy, and the original threshold
is known by all the members, it is always possible to determine the class that a
given member fell into at a given time, by determining how many executions of the
protocol have been performed up to that time.
5 Correctness
The scheme is correct, as shown by the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1 The cooperation among t cosigners belonging to diﬀerent classes, where
t is the current threshold, allows to issue a valid signature.
Proof. We consider the necessary cooperation among the cosigners in two cases: a)
at any time between the setup phase and the ﬁrst share-split; b) at any time between
the qth and the (q + 1)th share-split, for an arbitrary q.
a) If no share-split occurred, t partial signatures, with t odd, issued by using
diﬀerent shares, are necessary and suﬃcient to issue a signature Sig(m). Indeed,
since
∑t−1
i=0 ri ≡ 0 (mod φ(N)) by construction, and t is odd:
t−1∏
i=0
psigji(m) ≡
t−1∏
i=0
m(−1)
id+ri ≡ md ·m
Pt−1
i=0 ri ≡ md (mod N) = Sig(m).
b) Assume now that q share-splits, 1 ≤ q ≤ t, occurred, according to a round
robin policy. Let uig , g = 0, . . . , k + 1 (k odd), denote the random numbers chosen
to split share si; note that, for any i,
∑k+1
g=0 uig = 0 by construction; further, let s
′
i
the new value for si after the split, i.e. s
′
i = si + ui0, and let s
′
j = sj + si + uik+1
the new value of the proactively updated share sj. After q share-splits, the number
of shares required to issue a signature is t′ = t + qk. In particular, without loss of
generality, assume there are:
• t − 2q initial shares that are not aﬀected by the share-splits: sh = (−1)
hd + rh,
h = 0, . . . , t− 2q − 1;
• q new shares: s′i = (−1)
id + ri + ui0, i = t− 2q, . . . , t− q − 1;
• q initial shares, proactively updated: s′j = (−1)
jd + rj + si + uik+1, i ∈ [t −
2q, . . . , t− q − 1], j = t− q, . . . , t− 1;
• qk new shares sig = (−1)
gsi + uig , i = t− 2q, . . . , t− q − 1, g = 1, . . . , k. Let l be
the index of these shares, running as: l = t, . . . , t + qk − 1.
By combining t′ partial signatures, issued by using diﬀerent shares, since k is
odd and for any i,
∑k+1
g=0 uig = 0 by construction, then:
t+qk−1Y
c=0
psigjc (m) ≡
t−2q−1Y
h=0
m
sh
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
s′
i
t−1Y
j=t−q
m
s′
j
t+qk−1Y
l=t
m
sl ≡
t−2q−1Y
h=0
m
(−1)hd+rh
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
(−1)id+ri+ui0
t−1,t−q−1Y
j=t−q,i=t−2q
m
(−1)j d+rj+si+uik+1
t−q−1,kY
i=t−2q,g=1
m
(−1)gsi+uig ≡
0
@
t−2q−1Y
h=0
m
(−1)hd+rh
1
A ·
0
@
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
ui0
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
(−1)id+ri
1
A ·
0
@
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
si
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
uik+1
t−1Y
j=t−q
m
(−1)jd+rj
1
A ·
·
0
@
t−q−1Y
i=t−2q
m
−si
t−q−1,kY
i=t−2q,g=1
m
uig
1
A ≡
t−1Y
h=0
m
(−1)hd+rh
t−q−1,k+1Y
i=t−2q,g=0
m
uig ≡ m
d
· m
Pt−1
h=0
rh (mod φ(N)) ≡ m
d
(mod N) = Sig(m).
The same arguments hold if q > t, considering that every share is equal to an
initial share, added to a random factor uxg , g ∈ [0, k+1] for some x ∈ [0, t+qk−1].
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6 Eﬃciency
In this section we show that the number of extra bits required to support our scheme
is limited by a small constant, with overwhelming probability, hence the solution is
pretty feasible in resource-constrained environments such as MANETs, as well as in
other ad hoc settings. Note that this analysis is necessary, because the operations for
increasing the threshold are performed over the integers, not in modulus, then the
share/veriﬁer bit-length could increase with the number of share-splits performed,
aﬀecting both storage requirements and computational costs of our solution.
Share and veriﬁer bit length. The analysis is based on three facts from
elementary probability [12]. Let X be a random variable with uniform distribution
in the range [−N−12 ,
N−1
2 ], μX be its expected value and σ
2
X its ﬁnite variance.
Then:
Fact 6.1 μX = 0 and σ
2
X ≤
(N−1)2
12
Fact 6.2 for any constant a > 0, the random variable Z = aX has ﬁnite variance
σ2Z = a
2σ2X .
Fact 6.3 for any constant k > 0, P (|X − μX | ≥ k) ≤
σ2
X
k2
.
Let us now consider q share-splits that aﬀect a given share si. Without loss
of generality, assume si is one of the initial shares provided in the initialization
phase by the trusted dealer. After q share-splits, the new share is s′i = ±d + ri
(mod φ(N)) + u1 + u2 + . . . + uq, where ri ∈
[
−N−12 ,
N−1
2
]
has been randomly
selected by the trusted dealer, and uj ∈
[
−N−12 ,
N−1
2
]
, j = 1, . . . , q, are the numbers
randomly selected by the designated member at the jth share-split. Indeed, the
share could have value s′i = ±m · d + r (mod φ(N)) + u1 + u2 + . . . + uq,m ≥ 0, as
eﬀect of the split of other shares, in the event of si to be chosen for the proactive
update. However, the expected value for m is 1. Let each uj be modeled by a
random variable Uj. Since Uj has uniform distribution over
[
−N−12 ,
N−1
2
]
, from
fact 6.1, it follows that μUj = 0 and σ
2
Uj
= (N−1)
2
12 . Let be U =
∑q
j=1 Uj. By
the linearity of the expectation, E[U ] = E[
∑q
j=1 Uj] =
∑q
j=1 E[Uj ] = 0. Further,
since the random variables Uj are independent: σ
2
U = σ
2
U1+...+Uq
=
∑q
j=1 σ
2
Uj
=∑q
j=1
(N−1)2
12 =
q(N−1)2
12 . Hence, by fact 6.3, for a given constant b > 0:
P (|U − μU | ≥ b ·N) = P (|U | ≥ b ·N) ≤
σ2U
(b ·N)2
=
q(N − 1)2
12b2N2
<
q
12b2
(2)
We are interested in the probability that U is greater than bN and, in particular,
we want this probability to be less or equal to a desired small value p. It turns out
from (2) that the least value satisfying the inequality is b = 12
√
qp−1
3 . Note that, in
order to represent bN , at most 	log2 bN
 = 	log2 b+ log2 N
 bits are necessary. On
the other hand, the initial share si = d + ri (mod φ(N)) can be represented over
at least 	log2 N
 − 2 bits. Hence, the necessary number of extra bits required for a
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share by our solution is
extra bits = 2 + 	log2 b
 = 2 +
⌈
log2
(
1
2
√
qp−1
3
)⌉
(3)
In order to ﬁgure out how (3) impacts on the length of the share, consider the
following example: assume q = 230 share-splits aﬀecting si have been performed,
and p = 2−30. Note that, by assuming a round robin policy for selecting the share
to split, the actual total number of performed splits is much higher. It follows that
b = 229, hence 31 extra bits are enough for any practical use.
Similar arguments hold for veriﬁers. After q splits of si, the corresponding
veriﬁer is: w′i = ±1 + e · ri (mod φ(N)) + e(u1 + u2 + . . . + uq). Let be W =∑q
j=1 Wj =
∑q
j=1 e · Uj = e · U . Note that e is a constant, then, by Fact 6.2, it
follows that σ2W = e
2σ2U . Hence, by leveraging the results provided for the share,
for a given constant c:
P (|W − μW | ≥ c ·N) = P (|U | ≥ c ·N) ≤
σ2W
(c ·N)2
<
e2q
12c2
(4)
By choosing c = b · e, (2) and (4) yield the same value. It follows that, if
e = 216 + 1, as usual in common settings [21], a practical number of extra bits
required for the veriﬁer by our solution is 2 + 	log2 c
 = 2 + 	log2(be)
 = 2 +
	log2 b
+ 	log2 e
 = 31 + 17 = 48.
Table 1 summarizes the overhead incurred for each protocol execution: prgs
is the number of pseudo-random generations required; Applicant is any individual
requesting a signature; Cosigner is any node participating to the signature issuance;
Designated is a current cosigner delegated to execute the share-split; t is the current
threshold; si is the current share for members in class C
t
i , and wi is the corresponding
veriﬁer; |Cti | is the size of C
t
i ; k is the number of newly created shares (that is,
classes) at each share-split. We assume that any number a can be expressed in at
most 	log2 a
 bits, and the RSA exponentiations are performed with the Square-
and-Multiply algorithm.
Role Operations
modular Messages prgs
multiplications sent received
signature issuance Applicant Dx t + 1.5log2 e+ t t 0
1.5tlog(e · wi)∗
Cosigner Dji 1.5log si 1 1 0
threshold increase Designated Dji 0 |C
t
i |+ |C
t
j | + 1 0 k+1
Member in Cti 1.5log(si · e · wi) 0 2 0
Member in Ctx 1.5log(si · e · wi) 0 2 0
Table 1
Overhead sustained by nodes in diﬀerent roles.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a secure, adaptive, robust and eﬃcient mecha-
nism to provide distributed signatures in ad hoc groups. In particular, we have
proposed a dynamically adjustable signature threshold scheme. This feature, that
allows to adapt to an increasing level of threat the ad hoc group is subject to, has
been implemented by leveraging a peculiar property of RSA cryptosystem. Further,
all the features of the proposed mechanism are achieved requiring just local com-
munications and very little overhead, in terms of both memory and computations
requirements. These appealing characteristics make these protocols particularly
suitable for the mobile ad hoc environment, and appealing even for resource con-
strained devices. Finally, the proposed scheme allows to detect nodes that attempt
to disrupt the distributed signature service by providing a non-valid contribution
to the computation.
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